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PAIN AND SUFFERING AND BEYOND:
SOME THOUGHTS ON RECOVERY FOR
INTANGIBLE LOSS
Robert L. Rabin*
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Louis Jaffe, most prominently known for his influ-
ential administrative law scholarship, turned his attention to tort-and
indeed to an infrequently visited corner of tort scholarship-the law
of damages.' More particularly, Jaffe addressed pain and suffering
damages in an article that is still frequently cited as a pivotal analysis
of the topic. Jaffe began on a bold note, asking provocatively: "But
why should the law measure in monetary terms a loss which has no
monetary dimension? ' 2 Throughout the article, in a similarly skepti-
cal tone, he returned to the theme of "the arbitrary indeterminateness
of the evaluation."'3 Indeed, it is for this theme, and the consequent
conclusion that pain and suffering damages might well be eliminated,
that the article is most remembered.
In fact, read closely, Jaffe's views turn out to be far more equivocal.
For every thrust in the direction of eliminating intangible-loss recov-
ery altogether, there is a retreat to the position that compensation for
past pain is the principal object of his attack. 4 Still, it is possible to
trace his restive, begrudging stance on the prospect of awarding dam-
ages for intangible loss of any sort to a continuing chorus of skeptics in
the ensuing decades of scholarship. The skeptics range from a law and
economics scholarship that puzzles over the question of why prospec-
tive injury victims should be, in effect, forced to purchase a form of
insurance (pain and suffering) that has not been sufficiently valued to
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to John W. Elias for his
research assistance.
1. See Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953).
2. Id. at 222.
3. Id. at 224.
4. Id.
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be offered in the market, to a leftist critique that objects to the com-
modification of misfortune. 5
Indeed, corresponding roughly to the fiftieth anniversary of the
publication of Jaffe's article, Joseph H. King, Jr. gives it pride of place
in the epigraph to his recent article advocating without qualification
the across-the-board, wholesale elimination of pain and suffering
damages in personal injury cases.6 King argues that from any widely
accepted perspective on the goals of tort law-compensation, deter-
rence, corrective justice and fairness, administrative cost concerns,
and the like-pain and suffering recovery ought to be eliminated and
recovery should be granted exclusively for economic loss suffered as a
consequence of personal injury.7 This wide-ranging attack poses sub-
stantial challenges to the awarding of intangible loss. Among a litany
of criticisms, King's fundamental concerns are that uncertainty of val-
uation fosters unpredictability of outcomes, hence undercutting opti-
mal deterrence and rational experience-rating-and correspondingly,
uncertainty promotes wide disparity among recoveries, hence violat-
ing fairness notions of like treatment for like cases. These conse-
quences are unavoidable, the argument goes, because of the
incommensurability between psychic harm and pecuniary redress.
Moreover, occasional break-the-bank awards generate insolvency and
inability to compensate more "deserving" claims, and correlatively un-
dercut the capacity to distribute losses widely and efficiently through
the pricing mechanism.
Whatever the counterarguments may be, these persistent qualms
about compensating pain and suffering seem, at a minimum, good
grounds for locating pain and suffering more precisely on the spec-
trum of tort claims for redress of intangible loss, and considering
whether the reservations about pain and suffering recovery are con-
5. Compare Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988) (providing a law and economics critique), and George L. Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J., 1521, 1536 (1987), with Rich-
ard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
79, 99-100 (1986) (advancing a critical legal studies perspective). Professor Abel restates his
thesis and broadens the scope of his attack in this volume of the DePaul Law Review. See Rich-
ard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Incoherent (But
Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2005).
6. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law,
57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004). The epigraph, drawn from Jaffe, is as follows: "We have come to
accept almost without question the monetary evaluation of the immeasurable perturbations of
the spirit. But why should the law measure in monetary terms a loss which has no monetary
dimension?" Id. (citing Jaffe, supra note 1, at 222).
7. King would include economic outlays for pain reduction and would also establish attorney's
fees as an independent head of damages. See id. at 205-08.
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text-bound or have wider applicability. 8 In thinking about pain and
suffering from this broader perspective on compensation for intangi-
ble loss, I will suggest commonalities that firm up the base for recog-
nizing the legitimacy of pain and suffering recovery. At the same
time, however, drawing on the inventory of torts recognizing intangi-
ble loss, I will suggest reservations about the "make-whole" princi-
ple-the notion that tort compensation has conventionally aspired to
restore an injury victim to a pre-injury position.
I begin with some thoughts on context internal to the pain and suf-
fering claim in an accidental harm case. Then, I offer a broader histor-
ical overview of intangible loss that leads, in turn, to a look at the
present landscape from a wide-angle perspective. Finally, in view of
the many byways that intangible loss has taken, I reassess the coher-
ence of a "make-whole" foundation for pain and suffering.
II. A BRIEF ANALYTIC AND HISTORICAL EXCURSION
At the outset, it is interesting to note that most critics of intangible-
loss recovery-including both Jaffe and King, a half century apart-
focus their attention on pain and suffering recovery without any
grounding in context, creating the impression that it is a poor relation
(parasitic, some might say) of the robust and well-defined nuclear
family of medical expense, lost income, and rehabilitative outlays, all
recoverable under the rubric of "pecuniary loss."9 This is highly prob-
lematic both as an analytic and a historical proposition.
A. An Analytic Note
To begin with the analytic, the point is not to question the impreci-
sion of pain and suffering damages, but rather to remark on the critics'
correlative contrast to pecuniary loss. Although the point seems to
get lost in the critique of pain and suffering, every tort scholar recog-
8. As this suggests, it is not the purpose of this article to debate the merits of whether pain
and suffering damages are excessively unpredictable and incoherent (incommensurable), as
some have claimed. But note that when a critic such as King makes these arguments, he assumes
that pain and suffering awards are unbounded. There is no necessary basis for this assumption,
as I discuss in Part III. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. In addition, while the
incommensurability argument is tautologically correct, it is insensitive to the complex pathways
by which loss of enjoyment of life and indignity may be ameliorated. The artist who can no
longer paint or the athletic individual who can no longer participate in competitive events may
not be restored to his or her pre-existing condition by a monetary award, but he or she may be
given the opportunity to develop new intellectual enthusiasms, travel possibilities, and spectator
satisfactions. See, e.g., Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emo-
tional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982).
9. An exception is Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REV. 772 (1985).
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nizes that there is frequently extraordinary uncertainty and impreci-
sion involved in recovery of pecuniary loss in serious injury cases of
the sort that generate high intangible-loss awards.
Illustratively, in the landmark California case on noneconomic loss,
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines,10 where plaintiff suffered horren-
dous, permanently deforming foot injuries that required repeated sur-
gery-and indeed held out the prospect of several future operations
and a lifetime of pain-the main contested issue was the amount of
pain and suffering damages.1 What is revealing, however, for our
purposes, is that the opinion does not address the imprecision about
the plaintiff's future economic loss. The year is 1961, and looking to
the future, plaintiff recovers $1,000 (in total) for drugs over an esti-
mated future life expectancy of thirty-four years; $2,000 per year in
medical expenses for the next ten years, and $200 per year thereaf-
ter.12 Moreover, if Seffert suggests staggering underestimation of the
future course of likely medical expenses, virtually every case involving
the permanent incapacity or serious diminution in ability of an indi-
vidual in an early stage of apparently promising professional develop-
ment involves highly imprecise estimation of future lost earnings. t 3
The short of it is that setting one's sights on the uncertain character
of noneconomic loss creates an illusion that is simply inaccurate: that
there is a sharp distinction between noneconomic and economic loss
on the dimension of precision in valuation. This does not, of course,
negate a concern about the amorphous character of pain and suffering
recovery. It does, however, put the concept of "making the victim
whole"-the oft-rehearsed restorative function of compensatory dam-
ages-in a far less fine-tuned perspective that may, in turn, cast a dif-
ferent light on the preoccupation with imprecision in critically
assessing the case for recovery of pain and suffering loss.
B. A Historical Perspective
No serious tort scholar would claim that compensation for intangi-
ble loss was first recognized in cases of recovery for accidentally
10. 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
11. Id. at 340-44.
12. Id.
13. Not necessarily underestimation, of course. More generally, whether over- or underesti-
mated, in an ironic twist on the insurability argument against recovery of noneconomic loss, this
element of high-side lost earnings is a strikingly regressive feature of the loss distribution func-
tion of tort awards. Low income earners subsidize high income earners through the distribu-
tional consequences of tort law "insurance" against wage loss.
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caused physical injury-the domicile of pain and suffering recovery. 14
Nonetheless, the most withering critiques of pain and suffering treat it
largely in a historical vacuum, almost as though it is an anomalous
feature of tort law. 15 Quite the contrary is the case, and a brief explo-
ration of its historical roots is a useful mechanism for reassessing the
make-whole principle as the linchpin for compensatory relief.
The reality is that even a cursory examination of the antecedents to
recovery for accidental harm-which in itself dates back less than 200
years as an identifiable category of tort liability-reveals a wholesale
acceptance of assigning responsibility for tortious misconduct involv-
ing solely intangible loss at least as early as medieval times. 16 Many a
student of torts is initiated into the historical treatment of the subject
by introduction to L de S. and Wife v. W. de S.17 In this classic four-
teenth century assault case, the defendant works out his frustration at
arriving to the plaintiff's drinking establishment after closing by taking
a swing with his hatchet at the wife of the proprietor, putting her in
apprehension of injury. Apprehension, but in fact, no contact and no
physical injury. And it is that apprehension of unwanted physical con-
tact that is, of course, the gist of the assault tort.
Likewise, in the venerable tort of false imprisonment, the prima fa-
cie case is made out by establishing an unjustified constraint on the
victim's freedom of locomotion. 18 Physical injury, let alone pecuniary
loss, plays no role in establishing the right to recovery. Notably, in the
innovative Gregory and Kalven torts casebook of a generation ago,
adopting harm from insult, indignity, and shock as the organizing prin-
ciple for the second part of the subject, the authors refer to false im-
prisonment as "another example of a traditional tort of intent which
for centuries has served as a means of protecting against subtle indig-
nities and emotional unpleasantness." 19
If assault and false imprisonment are perhaps the oldest and most
prominent of the judicially accepted intentional torts compensating
for free-standing intangible loss, they are by no means isolated exam-
14. An illuminating historical account tracing recovery for intangible loss back to Roman Law
is Jeffrey O'Connell & Theodore M. Bailey, The History of Payment for Pain & Suffering, in
Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita James Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When
& Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 83 app. 5.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 14.
17. 1348 Liber Assisarum, folio 99, Placitum 60, microformed on Great Britian Yearbooks,
1307-1587, Fiche 2.
18. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 67-69 (2000).
19. CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 927
(2d ed. 1969).
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pies. A cuckolded husband might bring an action for criminal conver-
sation against an outsider who had sexual relations with his wife; or
more broadly, an outsider might be sued under the banner of aliena-
tion of affections for less forceful means of interfering with the marital
relationship. 20 Once again, these torts compensated for the distress-
related claims of the wronged party without reference to any out-of-
pocket loss as a consequence of the defendant's conduct.
Moreover, if these latter torts based on distress-related claims of
interference with family relationships have something of an archaic
flavor, the same cannot be said for assault and false imprisonment.
Indeed, the latter tort has at least two areas of distinctly contempora-
neous application: actions by aggrieved employees against employers
engaged in constraining behavior to interrogate pursuant to suspicions
of embezzlement, and even more common, claims by aggrieved shop-
pers constrained on suspicion of shoplifting. 21
Finally, this brief survey of early claims of intangible loss would be
incomplete without reference to an area in which intentional wrong-
doing was not a prerequisite; indeed, where strict liability was early
recognized (viz., the torts of libel and slander), it sought to redress
reputational harm.22 Here, arcane rules served as a qualifier. Tradi-
tionally a common-law slander claim required a showing of special
damages-that is, economic loss-unless it fell into one of the desig-
nated categories generally accepted as establishing slander per se.
Slander per se categories were based on a standing presumption of
grievous harm to reputation: charging plaintiff with a serious crime,
injuring plaintiff's business or professional reputation, imputing lack
of chastity to a woman, or asserting that plaintiff had a loathsome dis-
ease.23 But note that these per se categories, obviating the need to
show any pecuniary harm, covered a great deal of ground. And in
addition, no similar constraint was imposed on libel actions; reputa-
tional harm was implied in such cases and required no proof of special
damages.24
It may be argued, of course, that all of these torts grew in soil differ-
ent from pain and suffering for accidental harm. They served differ-
20. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1245-49.
21. See, e.g., Andrea A. Elliott, In Stores, Private Handcuffs for Sticky Fingers, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2003, at Al.
22. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
2-96 (3d ed. 2000).
23. Id.
24. In some states, however, special damages are required unless the libel is clear on its face
("libel per se"). See id. §§ 2.8.2-2.8.3.
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ent functions, and concomitantly, promoted different goals. On its
face, this point is uncontestable.
But beneath the surface the picture is more complicated. At the
threshold, it is critical to note that the foundational objection to pain
and suffering recovery is based on its incommensurability. We cannot
repair past pain by provision of money damages, nor is future pain
alleviated (other than by economic outlays for drugs and rehabilita-
tion) or loss of enjoyment of life restored.
Concede the point that any restorative effects of monetary damages
are in a different currency. But how does this differ from the charac-
ter of intangible-loss recovery in other domains of tort law? By defi-
nition, what is true of pain and suffering has been historically true of
intangible-loss awards across the board: A victim is receiving money
for a harm that has no precise monetary equivalent.
Perhaps the starkest instance is assault. When the monetary award
is handed down, W. de S. is long-gone and the wife of I. de S. is pre-
sumably back behind the bar serving drinks, with perhaps some linger-
ing trepidation about ill-mannered patrons. Can her past
apprehension of physical injury be erased by a present award of
money damages?
Can past distress at confinement (through false imprisonment) be
retroactively addressed by a present pecuniary award? Can reputa-
tional harm be erased and consequent humiliation and distress retro-
actively eradicated by wealth-transfer from a defamer (as
distinguished from future-oriented repair by the reputation-affirming
judgment itself)? On the incommensurability dimension, then, the
case against monetary damages seems to spill well beyond the con-
fines of pain and suffering loss into every well-recognized channel of
compensatory relief.
But perhaps incommensurability is of lesser consequence in these
other domains of tort law because the purposes of assigning liability
were unrelated to making an injury victim whole. In other words, the
claim would be that the make-whole principle was (and is) foreign to
the objectives of these torts. Here, the case is somewhat more compli-
cated. Historical authority suggests that the criminal and civil law
remedies for wrongful conduct causing personal harm were closely in-
tertwined in medieval times and hence the punitive function of dam-
ages loomed large. 25 And, no doubt, even after civil recourse took an
25. On the early nexus of civil and criminal recourse, see Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the
Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970).
2006] 365
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independent pathway it retained a strong admonitory role in intangi-
ble harm cases such as assault and false imprisonment.
But one can speculate that from an early point in time, admonition
did double duty in both punishing the wrongdoer (specific deterrence,
as we would put it today), while also serving as a warning to prospec-
tive deviants within the community (general deterrence). In the latter
regard, the long-standing recognition of recovery for intangible loss
on deterrence grounds has a familiar ring to contemporary ears. By
way of illustration, consider a frequently quoted passage from Kwasny
v. United States,26 in which Judge Richard Posner put the matter suc-
cinctly, observing that:
We disagree with those students of tort law who believe that pain
and suffering are not real costs and should not be allowable items of
damages in a tort suit. No one likes pain and suffering and most
people would pay a good deal of money to be free from them. If
they were not recoverable in damages, the cost of negligence would
be less to the tortfeasor and there would be more negligence, more
accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence higher social costs. 27
Substitute "intangible loss" for "pain and suffering" in this passage,
and "assault" or "false imprisonment" (or for that matter any of the
early-recognized instances of wrongful conduct) for "negligence."
One then has a reading of the purposes of early recognition of nonpe-
cuniary harm entirely consonant with the spirit of modern times.28
Similarly, a reading of the early common-law recognition of responsi-
bility for intangible loss in less instrumental terms-as an authorita-
tive expression of social disapproval of normatively undesirable
conduct, or an effort to afford recognition of an inviolable right to be
free of invasion of physical security by another-has its counterpart in
contemporary justifications for recognizing the intangible aspects of a
victim's physical injury.29
My point is to counter a certain narrowness of vision in regarding
pain and suffering outside a historical context-a context that not only
afforded broad recognition to intangible loss as a legitimate source of
26. 823 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1987).
27. Id. at 197.
28. See generally GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970), on the concept
of general deterrence.
29. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56
(1993). Defamation is a more complicated case, historically and at present. See, e.g., Robert C.
Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 691 (1986) (discussing three perspectives on the goals of the law of defamation: restoration
of honor, dignity, and property-with particular emphasis on the dignitary aspirations of defa-
mation law). Once again, there is substantial overlap between the dignitary aspiration and the
objectives of pain and suffering recovery.
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civil redress, but almost certainly was impelled to do so for reasons
not markedly different from those that serve as the cornerstones for
theories of recovery for personal injury in modern accident law. Cor-
respondingly, one would be hard put to claim that the damages recov-
erable in these intangible-loss cases reflected any intention to make
the victim whole, rather than to roughly match the severity of the
harm to the character of the misconduct from a bi-party perspective. 30
C. An Update Note
There is a certain irony in pain and suffering damages coming under
attack in an era when the legitimation of recovery for intangible loss
has consistently broken new ground. The twentieth century was in
fact a veritable breeding ground for the development of new catego-
ries of tort recovery for intangible loss, and there is no sign of retreat
as a new century unfolds.
On the eve of the twentieth century, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published their landmark article proposing a new tort based
on invasion of privacy. 31 After a false start in New York, this virtually
unprecedented tort concept, based on redress for the indignity and
distress associated with offensive public revelations about one's pri-
vate life, became widely accepted.32 The tort expresses a sensibility
that seems distinctly modern. The notion of a protected zone of indi-
vidual privacy-a right to be let alone-would almost certainly have
seemed bizarre even a generation earlier. It required a new perspec-
tive on intangible loss, linked to both urbanization and a transforma-
tion in the print media, before the privacy tort could achieve
recognition.
New perspective or not, the standard arguments against conven-
tional pain and suffering apply here as well: What is the metric for
measuring invasion of privacy damages? In what sense is privacy re-
stored by a monetary award-indeed, doesn't the litigation enterprise
simply exacerbate the harm? How are potential defendants to assess
30. Moreover, in a sense these early instances recognizing intangible loss stand in bold relief
from pain and suffering recovery in modern accident law because they were freestanding in
character, in no sense dependent on related physical harm that was well recognized in its own
right. This holds true even for loss of consortium recovery, which came to be recognized in
tandem with pain and suffering. Loss of consortium, once disentangled from its feudal origin in
loss of spousal services, came to stand independently for the loss of the companionship and
counsel of the physical injury victim to the consortium claimant. See generally DOBBS, supra
note 18, at 841-43.
31. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
32. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1203-08.
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the likelihood and magnitude of risk? In fact, the public disclosure of
private facts tort has had a checkered career, and recoveries have
been few and far between. 33 But for present purposes, that is some-
what beside the point because the often insurmountable barrier to re-
covery has been the defense of newsworthiness, rather than the
refusal to recognize a prima facie harm.34
Moreover, a related privacy tort-the intrusion on privacy claim,
once again grounded entirely in intangible loss-has been far more
successful in recent years. If anything, the intangible harm here is
even more subtle and elusive than in the public disclosure cases, and
certainly more so than the "suffering" component of a pain and suffer-
ing award. By common assent, no publication is required to establish
an intrusion tort; rather, the harm resides in the prying, intrusive con-
duct itself.35
Thus, in a recent and widely noted case, Shulman v. Group W Pro-
ductions, Inc.,36 the California Supreme Court held that plaintiff, a
badly injured victim of an auto wreck whose responses and demeanor
in a rescue helicopter were recorded without consent for broadcast by
the defendant media outlet, established a colorable claim for intrusion
on privacy. Newsworthiness was no justification, as the court saw it:
"[T]he last thing an injured accident victim should have to worry
about while being pried from her wrecked car is that a television pro-
ducer may be recording everything she says to medical personnel for
the possible edification and entertainment of casual television
viewers."37
A similar theme of respect for the private aspects of one's life-an
effort to distinguish between spheres of public and private behavior-
characterizes a range of intrusion cases, from ambush interviews to
overzealous paparazzi.38 Just as in the public disclosure tort, a dam-
33. For an overview of the case law, see MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1100-31 (7th ed. 2001). For recent discussion, see
Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
34. For an interesting comparative perspective, see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cul-
tures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (contrasting the American
perspective on protecting the media through a newsworthiness defense with the European
view-in particular, France and Germany-downplaying the importance of media protection).
More generally, Whitman locates the American approach to privacy law as resting on cultural
concerns about safeguarding liberty, in contrast to European values based on upholding digni-
tary concerns.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
36. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
37. Id. at 503.
38. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Consider also statutory damage actions for intrusion on privacy by
technological means, such as wiretaps. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000). In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
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age award cannot compensate by erasing past distress, nor does an
award monetize in any precise sense the indignity associated with a
breach of an individual's zone of privacy. Apart from social welfare
aims of promoting deterrence, compensatory damages in these cases
once again can best be seen as a rough approximation of an irretriev-
able, but distinctly nonpecuniary loss.
If the right of privacy signaled a new conceptual departure in the
recognition of recovery for intangible harm, twentieth-century tort
law was notable as well for the crystallization of new categories of
rights within the well-established domains of intentional harm and
negligence. The new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED), not fully recognized until adoption of Section 46 of the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts in 1948, reiterates the theme of compensat-
ing for socially unacceptable behavior that falls below the radar screen
of criminal sanctions, just as in the case of assault and false
imprisonment. 39
But IIED, like the right of privacy, manifests a singularly twentieth-
century sensibility towards the right to be let alone. At its core, IIED
is a dignitary tort-an extension of the notion that psychic autonomy,
and not just physical autonomy, warrants legal protection. 40 In this
sense, IIED ventures a stage beyond the traditional intangible-loss
torts of assault and false imprisonment-torts more closely tied to the
premise of a zone of physical danger. And from a similar comparative
perspective, IIED, as a twentieth-century manifestation of protection
against distress, humiliation, and indignity, seems still a further stage
beyond the linked aspirations of conventional pain and suffering dam-
ages to offer redress for intangible loss accompanying physical injury.
At a foundational level, of course, all of these avenues of compensa-
tory relief illustrate a theme that threads its way through this account:
514 (2001), the Supreme Court invalidated the application of the federal statute and its Penn-
sylvania counterpart in a damages claim against a third party repeater of an intercepted message.
Id. at 535. But the Court took pains to indicate the validity of the statute against the interceptor
and referred to the intangible-loss privacy claim as an interest of "the highest order." Id. at
527-28.
39. Section 46 was revised in a later version of the Second Restatement which adopted more
limiting language. In its present form it reads: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
40. lIED is a particularly interesting tort because it mirrors the evolving social attitudes about
the extent to which one is expected to have a thick skin in dealing with the occasional insults and
indignities that are a part of everyday life. The baseline has certainly shifted towards greater
protection of psychic distress, but not without continuing reservations. Compare Wallace v.
Shoreham Hotel, Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (D.C. 1946) (refusing to recognize liability for a public insult
in a restaurant), with Wishnatsky v. Huey, 584 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998) (similarly refus-
ing to recognize liability, a half century later, for rudeness in barring entry to a private meeting).
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the common law's resistance to pecuniary loss as a threshold for al-
lowing recovery.
Just such a threshold did, however, preclude recovery for negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress (NIED) well into the twentieth cen-
tury. Here too, the barrier, expressed in the form of the physical
impact requirement for recovery of intangible loss, has almost univer-
sally fallen.41 In its place, the courts have fashioned a "zone of dan-
ger" limitation-not unlike the prima facie requirement in intentional
harm torts of assault and false imprisonment-illustrated by the bar-
rier to NIED recovery being surmounted by "near-miss" cases such as
careening automobiles and malfunctioning thrill rides.42
In turn, newly arising late twentieth-century social concerns over
exposure to toxic substances put substantial stress on the zone of dan-
ger limitation. How are the courts to apply such a test to the rising
sensitivity over exposure to carcinogenic substances like asbestos,43 or
to perceptions of AIDS exposure? 44 The judicial tendency to sharply
circumscribe recovery in such cases-by a literal reading of the zone
of danger, or a stringent requirement of probable, imminent physical
consequences-cannot be taken as a resurrected denial of the legiti-
macy of NIED claims; there has been no rollback on the tort. Nor is it
based on skepticism about the commensurability of monetary relief-
courts now accept as a given that negligently induced fright can trans-
late into monetary awards. 45 Instead, the reluctance to extend NIED
into the dynamic field of toxic exposures rests on a perceived "flood-
gates" concern. 46
This floodgates objection introduces a novel element into the con-
tinuing saga of compensating for intangible accidental harm. By con-
trast, the concern about the impact of pain and suffering awards is a
concern about magnitude, not about floodgates (by definition, claims
for pain and suffering are dependent on correlative claims of physical
injury).47 In sum, whatever legitimate unease might exist over cabin-
41. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 835-39. The impact requirement was tantamount to holding the
line on intangible harm recovery in accident cases at conventional pain and suffering, since it
required a minimal physical injury as a touchstone to attendant recovery for nonphysical harm.
42. See Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y.
1961).
43. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997) (refusing to
recognize a "pure" emotional distress claim for fear of the consequences of exposure to
asbestos).
44. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 845-47.
45. Id. at 835-39.
46. See, e.g., Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 433.
47. Analytically, this distinction also encompasses third party (or bystander) NIED claims and
loss of consortium actions, all of which are add-on claims to physical harm litigation (as in the
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ing NIED seems to reflect trepidation over unleashing litigation aris-
ing out of the fears and insecurities animated by our techno-chemical
age, rather than a broader reassessment of the case for acknowledging
this doctrinal category of noneconomic loss.
Meanwhile, claims for tort-type intangible loss flow into new chan-
nels, cut out of the topsoil of statutory relief. One such channel has
been the revitalization of federal civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which creates a civil damages remedy for "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws," against government officials acting under color of state law.48
A single instance will suggest the tenor of these intangible harm
claims. In the 1980s, the Chicago police department's policy of con-
ducting strip searches of female arrestees led to a series of cases in
which the policy was found to be a deprivation of rights secured under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus a § 1983 viola-
tion.49 The consequent emotional trauma and humiliation arising out
of the searches served as the basis for damage awards.5 0 Some of the
cases involved strips and visual inspections without further claims of
indignity; others involved "aggravating circumstances" such as physi-
cal inspection, taunting, and even recording on camera.5' Just as at
common law, Congress set no guidelines for damage assessment in
these cases, leaving the courts with open-ended discretion to monetize
emotional distress.52
While the roots of these § 1983 actions can be traced to common-
law false imprisonment torts, another channel of statutory relief-Ti-
tle VII claims for sexual harassment in the workplace-can be seen as
an outgrowth of the more recent common law development of an
case of pain and suffering) rather than occasions for judicial recognition of new tort duties rais-
ing concerns about a relatively unbounded number of new claims. Compare this, however, to
the recognition of lIED as an independent tort, which did raise floodgate concerns, namely, the
carving out of a manageable category of "outrageous conduct," as distinguished from lesser
slights. See supra note 40; see also Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and
the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Con-
duct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
49. The initial case was Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
50. Id. at 1275.
51. For description of circumstances, drawing on some of the earlier cases, see Levka v. City
of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1984).
52. In a single year, damage recoveries against the City of Chicago ranged from
$3,300-$112,000. Id. at 425. For discussion of intangible-loss recovery in § 1983 actions involv-
ing deprivation of constitutional rights other than Fourth Amendment violations, see MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, 1C SEcrIc;j 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§§ 16.10-16.15 (3d ed. 1997).
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IIED tort.53 Here, too, intangible harm-in these cases established by
showing conduct "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment ... [that] would be reasonably
perceived, and is perceived as hostile or abusive,"-has served as the
foundation for a discrete category of statutory tort actions.54
Just as in IIED cases, the courts have struggled with the dividing
line between incivility that is "merely offensive" and that which is suf-
ficiently serious to give rise to a claim.55 But again, once the liability
threshold is surmounted, the court's discretion to award nonpecuniary
damages is unquestioned (and largely unconstrained), and true to the
consistent pattern of intangible-loss torts, damage assessment is un-
bounded by notions of restoring the victim to a preharassment state of
emotional equilibrium.
I have undertaken this brief historical excursion in part to docu-
ment the proposition that pain and suffering recovery stands solidly
within a long-standing and dynamic tradition of compensation for in-
tangible loss. But at the same time, this narrative has suggested that
compensation has never stood as an end goal in itself of tort law.
Viewed through the prism of generic recovery for intangible loss, one
finds that compensation has frequently served either an instrumental
or an expressive function: a means of promoting deterrence, articulat-
ing social norms, or doing corrective justice (or a mix of these goals).
The same can be said for pain and suffering loss in accidental harm
cases. Here, too, there is fundamental disagreement among thought-
ful tort observers over the goals of the system.56 In addition, there are
simply too many gaps in allowing recovery of nonpecuniary loss for
compensation to be viewed as an end in itself. For example, accident
law generally does not compensate for distress associated with prop-
erty loss. 57 It does not even compensate for economic loss, let alone
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It should be noted however, that in most of these cases the defen-
dant is the employer, and thus is vicariously responsible for the intentional misconduct of the
coworker who engages in the sexual harassment. See generally GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE (2001).
54. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
55. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
56. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. See also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Han-
son, The Nonpecuiary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1785 (1995). For earlier discussion of divergent views in the theoretical literature on the
more general goals of tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of
Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 977-85 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1999) (refusing to uphold lower court's
award of damages where plaintiffs claimed that contractor's negligence in constructing "dream
house" caused emotional distress); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (disallowing an NIED claim for destruction of art works). But for a minority view,
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noneconomic loss, in most cases of nonfault-based physical injury. 58
And it recognizes a wide array of policy limitations on intangible-loss
recovery in fault-based cases, articulated through no-duty and proxi-
mate cause rules as well as defenses.59 Again, these limitations fre-
quently preclude all forms of compensation, not just nonpecuniary
loss.
I do not mean to suggest that victim compensation has merely been
an afterthought in the evolutionary process of common law and statu-
tory obligations in tort-a process in which recovery for intangible
loss has played a central role. But successful implementation of the
disparate set of goals referred to in this historical survey has not
turned on the capacity to measure on a case-by-case basis the precise
dollar equivalents of insult, indignity, or emotional distress.
III. THE MAKE-WHOLE PRINCIPLE REASSESSED
So, where is one to turn for guidance on a conceptual approach to
valuation of nonpecuniary loss? Here, the lessons of history are not
particularly helpful. Throughout the long development of liability for
intentional wrongdoing, culminating in its manifestations on the con-
temporary scene in IED and the statutory torts, judges and juries
have exercised relatively unlimited discretion in setting awards for in-
tangible loss.60 The protection of personality torts of defamation and
recognizing emotional distress recovery for damage to plaintiff's home, see Rodrigues v. State,
472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
58. The Restatement Second of Torts does recognize strict liability for "abnormally dangerous
products." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977). But the category has re-
mained narrow over the years. The more recent developments in the products liability area
provide for nonfault liability under far more limited circumstances than was originally thought to
be likely; essentially, in cases of manufacturing defects, with some courts extending nonfault to
design defect cases as well under the guise of a consumer expectations test (a move disfavored
by the Restatement Third of Products Liability). A good summary discussion is in KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 193-201 (2d ed. 2002).
59. See, e.g., Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (addressing policy limita-
tions on intangible loss in loss of consortium claims); see also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal.
1968) (same for bystander emotional distress claims); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y.
1984) (same).
60. The model California jury instruction on emotional distress reads as follows:
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law by which to fix
reasonable compensation for emotional distress. Nor is the opinion of any witness re-
quired as to the amount of such reasonable compensation .... In making an award for
emotional distress you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment
and the damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in the light of the evidence.
CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIvIL § 12.88 (8th ed. 1994). An interesting case, illustrating that
unconfined discretion may be the norm but is not inevitable, is Levka v. City of Chicago, 748
F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1984). There the court engaged in a detailed factual comparison of awards for
emotional distress in previous strip search cases, pursuant to reversing the trial court award and
remanding with instructions to remit by half or order a new trial. Id. at 425-26.
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privacy offer no greater guidance; once again, they leave the content
of presumed or general damages, when available, at the largely un-
checked discretion of the fact-finder. 6'
In the realm of accident law itself, model jury instructions on com-
pensatory damages offer no clue as to a methodology for calculating
pain and suffering awards. Standard jury instructions recite a general
exhortation to act reasonably, as in California: "No fixed standard ex-
ists for deciding the amount of these damages. You must use your
judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the evidence and
your common sense. '62 And appellate courts, in exercising a review
function, have ordinarily had no more guidance than the common-law
dictate to overturn awards only if they "shock the conscience," or
some like formulation. 63 It is precisely this "open-endedness," of
course, that has led legions of torts critics, including those who accept
the legitimacy of pain and suffering awards, to decry both the unpre-
dictability and insensitivity to like treatment of like cases inherent in
standardless valuations. 64
A comprehensive review of the multitude of reform proposals
aimed at constraining discretion in awarding pain and suffering dam-
ages is far beyond the scope of this article. But a starting point in that
direction-consonant with the themes emphasized in this article-is
61. On libel and slander, the California jury instruction provides:
If you find that the defendant defamed plaintiff by a [libel] [slander] and that such
[libel] [slander] was a cause of general damages to plaintiff, in determining the amount
of such general damage, you should consider but are not limited to the following:
(1) The extent of the publicity given by the defendant to the [libel] [slander];
(2) Plaintiff's good name, reputation, and the loss thereof;
(3) Plaintiff's shame, mortification, injured feelings and mental suffering;
[(4) Plaintiffs prominence in the community where [he] [she] lives;]
[(5) Plaintiff's professional or business standing in the community where [he] [she]
does business.]
In determining the amount of plaintiff's damage, the law does not establish any abso-
lute fixed or mathematical rule or standard by which to compute such damage; there-
fore, you may exercise your discretion but must do so without passion or prejudice for
or against either party.
CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 7.10 (8th ed. 1994).
62. JUD. COUNCIL CAL., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUcTIONS § 3905A
(2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/civiljuryinst.pdf. An alter-
native formulation is found in CAL. JURY INSTRUCrIONS: CIVIL § 14.13 (8th ed. 1994), which
tracks precisely the language in the suggested emotional distress jury instruction, supra note 60,
except for substituting the term "pain and suffering" for "emotional distress." See Roselle L.
Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and
Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712 (2000).
63. See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
64. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 783-85, 791-92
(1995).
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the recognition that fidelity to the goals of tort law, and more particu-
larly to the compensation objectives of accident law, does not require
efforts to engage in precisely contoured case-by-case implementation
of a make-whole principle.
This was the reservation expressed by one of the leading jurists of
his generation, Justice Roger Traynor, dissenting in the Seffert case,
discussed earlier in another connection.65 In response to the major-
ity's opinion upholding a then-substantial pain and suffering award for
an admittedly severe foot injury under standardless "shocks the con-
science" review, Justice Traynor noted that "[i]t would hardly be pos-
sible ever to compensate a person fully for pain and suffering," and
proceeded to suggest grounding the assessment in an examination of
awards for past injuries to legs and feet.66 At the time, Traynor's ob-
servation appeared to go largely unnoticed, swamped perhaps ironi-
cally by a rising tide of attention to expansionary tendencies in liability
rules spearheaded by Traynor and his court.67
This is not to suggest an inconsistency in Traynor's torts jurispru-
dence, however. As far back as Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,68 he
articulated an insurance-based perspective that would abandon cor-
rective justice notions of fault in favor of an enterprise liability frame-
work based on internalization and broad distribution of the costs of
accidental harm.69 The implications on the damages side of the
ledger-an actuarial perspective, dominated by concerns about pre-
dictability in risk assessment-were simply not spelled out. By the
1980s, however, these liability-expanding doctrinal tendencies had
largely run their course, replaced by a rising counter-current of criti-
cism aimed at the size of damage awards.70
In the ensuing years, tort scholars and reformers have proposed an
array of strategies for confining discretion that can roughly be cap-
tured under the headings of ceilings, scheduling, and informational ap-
proaches. Ceilings, which have proven most appealing to tort
65. Seffert, 364 P.2d at 346.
66. Id. at 345.
67. For reference to the leading cases in this era of expansionary activity, see Robert L. Rabin,
Rowland v. Christian: Hallmark of an Expansionary Era, in ROBERT L. RABIN & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, TORTS STORIES 73-75 (2003).
68. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
69. Id. at 440-41. See also Fleming James, Jr., Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of
Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur and Additur, 1 Duo. L. REV. 143 (1963).
70. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the
Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990) (describing the central features of the tort
reform movement in the 1980s); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the
Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992) (tracing the leveling-off of liabil-
ity expanding rules).
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reformers in the political arena, address the concern over unpredict-
able, high-side pain and suffering awards in a system of largely uncon-
fined discretion. 71 But they do so by abandoning the principle of
treating like cases in like fashion (especially if the ceiling is low), and
correlatively, by ignoring the common law tradition in assessing intan-
gible loss, traced in the preceding section, of seeking some rough cor-
respondence among severity of harm, egregiousness of conduct, and
size of monetary award. 72
Scheduling of damage awards, by contrast to ceilings, would create
profiles of harm, crystallized into discrete categories of specified
awards with upper and lower limits, ranked according to severity of
physical injury. Informational strategies would provide data on past
awards to a jury (or. trial judge) and, to the extent that an informa-
tional approach was coupled with a requirement of explaining sub-
stantial deviation from the data, would resemble a scheduling scheme.
Both scheduling, nascent in Traynor's Seffert dissent, and informa-
tional strategies are premised on a graduated approach that is realistic
about the limits of precision in monetizing the intangible, and yet de-
signed to recognize the qualitative differences between the psychic im-
pact of a spectrum of injuries ranging from quadriplegia and
permanently disfiguring burns to temporarily disabling bone
fractures. 73
This, too, would be outside the common-law tradition of unstruc-
tured discretion; indeed, it is more closely akin to the social welfare
model reflected in no-fault compensation schemes. 74 In this regard,
while scheduling or informational approaches demonstrate a some-
71. In 2003, twenty-four states had caps on noneconomic loss in medical malpractice cases.
See Fred J. Hellinger & William E. Encinosa, U.S. Dep't Health & Human Serv., The Impact of
State Laws Limiting Malpractice Awards on the Geographic Distribution of Physicians (2003),
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/tortcaps.pdf. For an early academic proposal of across-
the-board ceilings on noneconomic loss, see Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958).
72. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for As-
sessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989);
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763
(1995); Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement
"Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303 (1989).
74. For purposes of establishing benefit awards for permanent disability, workers' compensa-
tion schemes generally utilize a schedule of designated categories of injuries. 4 ARTHUR LAR-
SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 86 (2000). Some of these schemes do allow for
specified-sum pain and suffering awards, for example The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986, which provides for pain and suffering awards up to a ceiling of $250,000. 42
U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (West 2003).
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what refined sensitivity to severity of harm considerations, they reflect
the influence of the no-fault compensation model in affording relative
indifference to gradations in the character of harm-imposing conduct.
It can be argued, however, that in the realm of accidental harm, where
moral condemnation of accident-generating behavior is muted, this
concession to a degree of routinization is warranted.
Nonetheless, scheduling and informational approaches are subject
to a variety of criticisms on administrative feasibility grounds, most of
which come down to the question of whether it is satisfying and just to
treat the unfortunate Yetta Sefferts of the world in quasi-categorical,
rather than individual, terms.75 There is no definitive response to this
line of objection. As just suggested, our historical tradition, carried
through to the present in contemporary versions of common law and
statutory torts of intent, continues to conceptualize intangible loss
from a bi-party perspective. Even discarding the nonsequitur that this
perspective requires a fine-tuned effort to make the victim whole, it
leaves open the question of whether pain and suffering should remain
squarely within the field of intangible loss, or rather should be harmo-
nized with the norms of enterprise liability.
75. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 64, at 791-92; see also JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on
Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BuFF. L. REV. 251 (2003).
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